Critical Infrastructure Resilience – Energy

Background

Jersey’s critical infrastructure can be described as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of Jersey or affect Jersey’s ability to ensure national security.

There are broadly twelve sectors that could be considered to be critical infrastructure for Jersey: Chemicals, Communications, Defence, Emergency Services, Energy, Finance. Food. Health, Space, Transport, Waste, and Water.

Ensuring the security and resilience of Jersey’s critical infrastructure is a responsibility shared by the States, infrastructure owners and operators. Each have different responsibilities for critical infrastructure depending on the system and/or the nature of the threats to be mitigated. Responses to a threat can involve the asset owner and operator, the technical and operational lead for Government and emergency services or law enforcement. Co-ordination among entities is therefore required to prepare, rehearse and respond to critical infrastructure threats.

Significant public funds can be spent responding to emergencies relating to critical infrastructure. It is important for Jersey to have in place an effective resilience framework supported by effective resilience plans and procedures across the States, asset owners and operators.

Scope

This review has evaluated whether the Government has an effective approach to critical infrastructure resilience for the energy sector that encompasses supporting and requiring asset owners and operators to implement high standards of resilience.

Articles 11 and 20 of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Jersey) Law 2014 make provision for me to prepare reports arising from my work and forward them to the Greffier of the States to be laid before the States Assembly. Paragraph 65 of the Code of Audit Practice (December 2023) provides that in determining the content and timing of public reporting I should have regard to potential prejudice to the interests of the States of Jersey or other parties arising from public reporting.

Having regard to this provision and the subject matter of this report, I have elected to issue a shorter report than usual, excluding my detailed findings but including the recommendations arising from my work. I am, however, providing relevant officers with a supplementary report that sets out more details of my findings to assist them in responding to the recommendations that I have included in this report.

Conclusions

A framework and documentation have been put in place to manage critical incidents and promote resilience. A new Resilience Law is proposed, based on good practice in other jurisdictions. These developments have potential to enhance controls, manage risk, provide assurance and promote resilience.

However, urgent action is required to put in place a robust Community Risk Register including energy infrastructure risks owned and managed by the Government and individual suppliers. Effective relationships must be built between the Government and all energy providers to enable the Jersey Resilience Forum to function effectively in respect of energy infrastructure risks.

Critical incidents in recent years should be the catalyst for the Government and its partners to address weaknesses in managing energy resilience. There is work to be undertaken by Government to enable it, as community leader, to provide Islanders with assurance on energy supply, fuel storage and distribution. Clear, resourced action plans should be developed to demonstrate how capacity is to be enhanced in an integrated way which balances short- and medium–term risk management and the needs and opportunities of future energy policy.